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JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this court is properly based upon the 
transfer of Civil Case No. 85-4313 by the Utah Supreme Court to 
this court under Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Honorable 
Frank G. Noel on June 6, 1988 in favor of Defendants, and from an 
Order entered on October 26, 1988 denying Plaintiffs1 Motion for 
a New Trial and to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Was Plaintiffs1 reference during trial to the defenses of 
illegality and mistake sufficient under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure to require that the trial court's ruling denying 
Plaintiffs1 Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the 
Evidence be reversed for abuse of discretion? 
2. Have Plaintiffs sufficiently marshalled the evidence to 
require that the trial court's conclusion that there was no fraud 
or negligent misrepresentation by Defendants be reversed for abuse 
of discretion? 
3. Did the trial judge abuse his discretion by viewing the 
property in dispute? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs are appealing the trial court's judgment awarding 
damages for Plaintiffs' default in payments to Defendants on a 
Promissory Note, and allowing Defendants to foreclose on the Trust 
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Deed securing such payments. The trial court subsequently denied 
Plaintiffs1 Motion for a New Trial and to Amend the Pleadings to 
Conform to the Evidence. Plaintiffs have appealed this order. 
In March 1979, Defendants Martin S. and Reva S. Ovard 
purchased two one-acre lots, a "front" lot and a "back" lot, from 
Layne Newman. (Trial Transcript (hereinafter "Tr.") 58, Trial 
Exhibits (hereinafter "Ex.") 12-D and 13-D). The transactions were 
executed by two separate trust deeds, each covering one acre (Tr. 
222). The two lots were purchased for a total of $58,000, or 
$29,000 for each lot or acre, and were closed at separate times 
(Tr. 58, 206-07, 215). 
The lots were part of a subdivision plan of Mr. Newman 
encompassing five one-acre lots just north of 650 East 13800 South, 
Draper, Utah (Tr. 58, 61, 206). However, the subdivision plan was 
not approved by the City of Draper (Tr. 60). As a consequence, a 
variance was applied for and granted by the City of Draper so that 
the Ovard's could build a home on the front lot (Tr. 60-61, Ex. 
7-P) . The Ovard's request was accompanied by a map showing both 
lots (Tr. 61, Ex. 6-P) . The Ovard's then built a home on the front 
lot, intending to live there (Tr. 64-65). Before they could move 
in, the Ovard's ran into financial trouble and sold the house and 
the front lot to a Mr. Nipco (Tr. 66). The Ovards also received 
money from Mr. Ovard's parents, Defendants Ben and Helen Ovard, and 
put Ben and Helen Ovard's name on the deed to the back acre so that 
they could recover their money by sale of the lot (Tr. 65-66, 216) . 
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Mr. Nipco subsequently ran into financial troubles and sold the 
house and the front acre to Plaintiffs in July 1982 (Tr. 67, 151). 
In April 1982, Defendants Ovard decided to list the back acre 
for sale with Alan Whipple, a realtor (Tr. 224) . In September 
1982, Plaintiffs noticed activity on the back acre and concluded 
that it might be sold (Tr. 152). Plaintiffs feared that someone 
would buy the lot, build on it, and obstruct Plaintiffs1 view from 
and enjoyment of their property (Tr. 153). Plaintiffs did not want 
anyone to build on the back acre (Tr. 119-120, 185), and contacted 
their own realtor, Fred Hale, to discuss buying the adjoining back 
lot in order to prevent someone from building on it (Tr. 153, 155) . 
Mr. Hale and Plaintiffs then prepared an offer of purchase, and Mr. 
Hale then presented the offer to Defendants (Tr. 120). 
On September 18, 1982, Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into 
an Earnest Money Agreement pursuant to which Defendants agreed to 
sell and Plaintiffs agreed to purchase the back acre for $26,000 
(R. 201). On November 8, 1982, Plaintiffs delivered and Defendants 
received and recorded a Trust Deed Note (hereinafter "Note") in the 
amount of $25,900, with interest only at 15% per annum payable on 
January 15, 1984, and $25,900 principal, plus then accrued 
interest, payable on November 15, 1985 (R. 201). 
Prior to closing of the sale between Plaintiffs and Defen-
dants, Plaintiffs did not request and Defendants did not offer 
information concerning a variance on the property or the validity 
of the subdivision map (R. 202). Subsequent to the closing, 
Plaintiffs learned that the back lot would require a variance, 
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similar to the variance previously granted to Defendants, before 
the City of Draper would issue a building permit on the back lot 
(Tr, 168). 
Plaintiffs' only payment to Defendants under the Note has been 
an interest payment of $5000 made on March 1, 1984 (R. 202) . 
Plaintiffs did not make the balloon payment that was due on January 
15, 1985, and stated that they would not pay it (R. 202, Tr, 213). 
Defendants then attempted a non-judicial trust deed foreclosure, 
which was enjoined by Plaintiffs (R. 203). 
Plaintiffs filed this fraud action in Third District Court 
and Defendants counterclaimed to foreclose the Trust Deed. The 
matter was tried on October 26 and 27, 1987 before the Honorable 
Frank G. Noel. During the course of the trial, Plaintiffs moved 
to amend their pleadings to conform to what they claimed was 
evidence of mutual mistake of fact (Tr. 200), which was a claim and 
issue not contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 2-18). The Court 
reserved ruling on this motion (Tr. 204). Plaintiffs did not renew 
this motion during the remainder of or at the end of trial. 
At the close of trial, the trial Judge asked if either party 
objected if he went and viewed the property. Both counsel for 
Plaintiffs and counsel for the Defendants stated they had no 
objection (Tr. 264). Judge Noel then took the matter under advise-
ment (Tr. 264). 
On December 4, 1987, the court issued a memorandum opinion, 
finding in favor of Defendants on their counterclaim, and finding 
no cause of action on Plaintiffs' claim (R. 142-43). Plaintiffs 
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thereafter filed a Motion for New Trial and to Amend the Pleadings 
to Conform to the Evidence, this time to assert claims of il-
legality and unilateral mistake (R. 216-217, 227-229). These 
motions were denied (R. 256), and Plaintiffs appealed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The granting of leave to amend the pleadings under Rule 
15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is within the broad 
discretion of the court, and should not be disturbed absent a 
showing of abuse of discretion. Further, Plaintiffs did not 
sufficiently plead the defenses of illegality or mistake. 
Therefore, the trial court's decision to deny Plaintiff's Motion 
to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence should be upheld. 
II. A trial court's findings should not be disturbed unless 
they are so lacking in support as to be clearly erroneous. 
Plaintiffs have not met their burden to marshal the evidence or to 
construe it in a light most favorable to the trial court. 
Therefore, the trial court's finding of an absence of fraud or 
negligent misrepresentation should not be disturbed. 
III. The trial judge's viewing of the property in dispute 
was proper. Plaintiffs' allegation that the trial judge improperly 
used information gathered at the viewing is without foundation. 
The parties agreed to the viewing without condition. Further, the 
court explicitly stated that its viewing was not of primary 
importance to its decision. Finally, the judge's statements in 
regard to the viewing were based on facts in evidence, and are 
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further supported by evidentiary affidavits submitted in opposition 
to Plaintiffs1 post judgment motion to amend their pleadings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT 
BE DISTURBED. 
When issues not formally raised in the pleadings are tried by 
the express or implied consent of the parties, Rule 15(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "Rule 15(b)") allows the 
amendment of the pleadings. That the issue has been tried by the 
consent of the parties must be evident from the record. Colman v. 
Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). 
Further, it must "appear that the parties understood the evidence 
was to be aimed at the unpleaded issue." Id. at 785. 
a. The trial court's decision to deny Plaintiffs' motion 
was within the sound discretion of the court. 
This court has stated that there is a mandatory requirement 
to allow a party to amend its pleadings to conform to the evidence 
when issues are tried by the express or implied consent of the 
parties. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 
P.2d 507, 509 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). However, the question of 
whether the issues have been sufficiently tried, and thus the 
ultimate decision as to whether the amendment should be allowed, 
remains in the sound discretion of the court. Stratford v. Morgan, 
689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984); Westley v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 
663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983). Implied consent to try an issue may be 
found where there is no objection to introduction of supporting 
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evidence by an opposing party and where it appears that the 
opposing party understood that such evidence was aimed at an 
unpleaded issue. In any event, the opposing party must have had 
a fair opportunity to defend and introduce evidence. See Colman, 
supra at 785. 
In the present case, Plaintiffs have not shown that the denial 
of the Rule 15(b) motion was a clear abuse of discretion. To do 
so, Plaintiffs have to show that they sufficiently tried the issues 
of illegality and mistake. Plaintiffs cite Colman, supra, to show 
that they have done so. However, the issue in Colman. that of 
alter ego, was "fully tried," and evidence concerning "every 
element" was introduced without objection. Colman. supra at 785. 
Any claimed evidence of illegality or unilateral mistake 
introduced by Plaintiffs in the instant case would also support 
Plaintiffs' claim of fraud. Plaintiffs' counsel even acknowledged 
and argued such fact with respect to mistake (Tr. 241-243). 
The mere introduction of claimed evidence of mistake did not 
therefore place Defendants on notice that it was aimed at unpleaded 
issues of mistake as is required by Colman. supra. The motion of 
Plaintiffs' counsel at trial (Tr. 200-204) to amend their pleadings 
to assert mistake was the first act that could be argued to have 
placed Defendants on notice that Plaintiffs were asserting or 
relying on a claim of mistake. Defendants immediately objected to 
such motion (Tr. 200). 
Any introduction by Plaintiffs of claimed evidence of 
illegality likewise supported Plaintiffs' claims of fraud and did 
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not place Defendants on notice that such evidence was aimed at a 
claim of illegality. Plaintiffs did not move to amend their 
pleadings to assert illegality during trial when such a motion was 
made as to mistake (Tr. 200-204) , but such motion was made after 
trial and after judgment had been entered (R. 210-214, 216-217). 
Because Defendants were without notice that Plaintiffs were 
introducing evidence aimed at mistake and illegality at the time 
claimed evidence of such theories and issues was introduced, any 
alleged trial of such issues was not with actual or implied consent 
of Defendants and was inadvertent. Defendants did not therefore 
have fair opportunity to defend. This was so, especially with 
respect to the motion on illegality which was not made until after 
trial and after formal judgment was entered. Plaintiffs have 
therefore not satisfied the Colman case upon which they rely. 
Finally, as demonstrated in the next subsections, Plaintiffs 
have not sufficiently established and proven the elements of 
illegality and mistake and for that reason should not have been 
allowed to amend their pleadings. 
b. Plaintiffs did not sufficiently try and introduce evidence 
of illegality. 
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that 
a party must set forth the affirmative defense of illegality. To 
avoid a contractual obligation by claiming illegality, an appellant 
must show clearly and unequivocally that the contract is illegal. 
Mitchell v. American Savings and Loan Association, 593 P.2d 692, 
694 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). 
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Plaintiffs have not and cannot plead the defense of illegality 
because they have misconstrued its application. The illegality 
defense applies to contracts which are themselves prohibited by law 
or contrary to public policy. See Williams v. Continental Life and 
Accident Co. , 593 P.2d 708 (Idaho 1979); Greer v. Northwestern 
National Insurance Co. . 674 P.2d 1257 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
Plaintiffs do not allege that the contract between the parties is 
itself prohibited by law or contrary to public policy, and in fact, 
there is no statute that prohibits this contract. Rather, 
Plaintiffs argue that if Defendants illegally divided the property 
into two one-acre parcels, then a contract purporting to sell one 
of the divided acres should not be enforced. Even if this concept 
embraced the defense of illegality, Plaintiffs have not suffi-
ciently tried the defense. 
In their brief, Plaintiffs point to certain sections of the 
Trial Transcript to support their argument that illegality was 
sufficiently raised at trial (Brief of Appellants, 6-9). However, 
there is nothing in Plaintiffs' brief or the record which state 
that Defendants' actions were illegal. In the first part of their 
brief, Plaintiffs merely allege that Defendants' division of the 
land is subject to land use regulations. (Brief of Appellants, 6-
7; Tr. 17, 19 & 23) At the second part of their brief, Plaintiffs 
point to another part of the transcript where they allegedly argued 
illegality. (Brief of Appellants, 8-9; Tr. 175, 178-79) However, 
these sections of the Trial Transcript are arguments of counsel 
during an objection at trial. They are not evidence and cannot be 
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considered in determining whether Plaintiffs tried and put on 
evidence of illegality. 
Plaintiffs also cite Utah statutes for the proposition that 
Defendants acted illegally. Nevertheless, the applicability of 
these statutes was not raised at trial. Defendants1 basic premise 
of illegality, i.e., the illegal division of land, is unfounded, 
as the record clearly shows that Defendants1 predecessor owner had 
already divided the land into two one-acre parcels when Defendants 
initially purchased the land (Tr. 58, 222; Ex. 12-D and 13-D) . 
The defense of illegality does not apply to this case. Even 
if this court finds that it does, Plaintiffs did not sufficiently 
introduce evidence of it at trial. 
c. Plaintiffs did not sufficiently try and introduce evidence 
of mistake. 
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that 
"all averments of ... mistake shall be stated with particularity." 
The nature of mistake ultimately relied upon by Plaintiffs is 
unilateral mistake (R. 227-229), and their brief focuses only on 
the mistake of Plaintiff Joseph Sanders. The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated the elements that must be established under unilateral 
mistake: 
(1) The mistake must be of so grave a consequence that 
to enforce the contract as actually made would be 
unconscionable. 
(2) The matter as to which mistake was made must relate 
to a material feature of the contract. 
(3) Generally the mistake must have occurred notwith-
standing the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party 
making the mistake. 
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(4) It must be possible to give relief ... without 
serious prejudice to the other party except the loss of 
his bargain. In other words, it must put him in statu 
[sic] quo. 
Briaas v. Liddell. 699 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1985) (citations 
omitted). 
Using the same analysis as the Briaas court, even if Plain-
tiffs1 evidence is viewed favorably to them, it is still deficient 
as to at least one element, i.e., the exercise of ordinary dili-
gence. Id. The trial court concluded that "Plaintiffs failed to 
exercise due diligence at the time of purchase to determine the 
status of the Property," and that "under the totality of the 
circumstances, a reasonable person should have been alerted that 
there may be access problems ... that should have been investi-
gated." (R. 205-06). Therefore, Plaintiffs have not met their 
evidentiary burden of showing ordinary diligence on their part. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR 
NEGLIGENT REPRESENTATION BY DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT BE 
DISTURBED. 
Plaintiffs complain that the trial court did not find that 
false or negligent representations or opinions were made by 
Defendants to Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon 
such representations (Appellants' Brief 11-17). Plaintiffs claim 
these representations or omissions concerned a zoning variance 
under which Plaintiffs' house was built and whether the back acre 
purchased by Plaintiffs from Defendants was part of an approved 
subdivision and therefore a lot upon which a house could be built. 
It is noted that although the Plaintiffs' house was built by 
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Defendant Sam Ovard, the house was not purchased by Plaintiffs from 
any of Defendants but from an interim owner named Nipco (Tr. 66-
67) . The trial court did not find the evidence as Plaintiffs 
wanted. The court, inter alia, found Plaintiffs had in their 
possession a copy of a subdivision map (Exhibit 15-R) showing the 
property in question as a lot in a subdivision (R. 202) . Such map 
was not obtained from Defendants but was obtained from county 
records by the real estate agent engaged by Plaintiffs to assist 
them (Tr. 113-115). The trial court further found that Defendants 
did not represent to Plaintiffs anything concerning whether such 
map was approved or not approved, whether Plaintiffs1 house was or 
was not built pursuant to a zoning variance and that Plaintiffs did 
not request or ask for any such information (R. 202). The trial 
court then concluded (and as a prerequisite must have found) that 
any statements or omissions relied upon by Plaintiffs were not 
fraudulent or negligent and that even if they were, Plaintiffs 
reliance on them was not justifiable (R. 205). The court further 
concluded, because of visible conditions of the property purchased 
by Plaintiffs, they should have been alerted that access problems 
may have existed (R. 205-206). Lack of access to a public street 
is what precluded the ability to build a house on the property 
without a zoning variance (Tr. 17-19). 
Plaintiffs quarrel with the trial courts findings and lack of 
findings and therefore its conclusions of law and decision. In 
doing so, however, Plaintiffs have only reargued their version of 
-12-
the facts and that their legal interpretation thereof should have 
been accepted by the trial court. More is required. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter 
"Rule 52(a)") states: "In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury ... findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous...." 
(emphasis supplied) Plaintiffs have not shown that the trial 
court's findings of fact or lack thereof were clearly erroneous. 
Thus its findings should not be disturbed. 
a. Plaintiffs have not marshalled the evidence, but rather 
have recited only those facts that favor their side. 
The Utah Supreme Court most recently addressed Rule 52(a) in 
In re Estate of Bartell. 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 28, 1989). 
In Bartell. a widowed spouse appealed from a finding that she was 
not an "omitted spouse under her deceased husband's will". The 
court stated that under Rule 52(a), even when appealing a judge's 
findings of fact as opposed to a jury's findings, an "appellant 
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings 
are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the 
evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Id. at 4 
(quoting State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
As in Bartell. Plaintiffs in this case have 
not even attempted to marshal the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings, nor [have they] attempted to 
demonstrate that the trial court's findings are against 
the clear weight of the evidence, as required by Walker. 
Instead, [they] have essentially reargued the factual 
case submitted below, construing all evidence in a light 
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most favorable to [their] case and largely ignoring the 
evidence supportive of the trial court's findings. 
Id. 
Plaintiffs1 evidentiary burden for fraud is proof by clear and 
convincing evidence. Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 
1986). Not only have Plaintiffs failed to meet which burden, they 
did not marshal the evidence in an attempt to do so. As a result, 
this court must "rely heavily on the presumption of correctness 
that attends [the trial court's] findings,'1 and affirm its judg-
ment. Bartell. supra at 4. A reviewing court does not sit to 
retry cases submitted on disputed facts. Id. 
Because Plaintiffs did not attempt to marshal the facts in 
support of the trial court's findings and show them to be clearly 
erroneous, Defendants, though not required to do so, have marshaled 
and set forth below certain of the evidence which supports the 
trial court's failure to find that Defendants made intentional 
fraudulent or negligent representations or omissions as to the 
zoning variance and buildable status of the property or that, in 
any event, Plaintiffs had relied thereon. Review of such evidence 
clearly shows that it supports the trial court's position on how 
it found and did not find the facts and that the court's position 
is not against the clear weight of the evidence. 
1. Defendants predecessor owner (Mr. Newman) had a map (Exh. 
15-P) which showed a division of 5 lots including the one purchased 
by Plaintiffs from Defendants. Mr. Newman gave Sam Ovard a copy 
of this map (Tr. 58). 
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2. Fred Hale (Plaintiffs1 realtor who Plaintiffs asked to 
prepare with them an offer to purchase from Defendants (Tr. 112, 
117, 153) obtained Exh. 15-P not from Defendants or Mr. Whipple 
(the listing real estate agent) but from the County Recorders 
office (Tr. 113-115) . 
3. Mr. Hale provided Exh. 15-P to Plaintiffs (Tr. 113-114, 
154, 183). 
4. Exh. 15-P was not an approved subdivision map (Tr. 76). 
5. Defendants did not tell Plaintiffs that Exh. 15-P was a 
subdivision map (Tr. 183-184). 
6. Plaintiffs did not claim Exh. 15-P to be a subdivision map 
but regarded it only as a boundary survey (Tr. 183-184), and Mr. 
Sanders was familiar with boundary line surveys because of his 
experience with them (Tr. 182). 
7. Description of property on Exh. 10-P (listing card) as a 
private lane to tree line seclusion did not mean that someone could 
have a residence down the lane (Tr. 86). 
8. Mr. Whipple never talked to Plaintiffs about the property 
(Tr. 91-92) . He did talk to Mr. Hale, but he never told Plaintiffs 
or Mr. Hale that the lot was a buildable lot (Tr. 93). 
9. Regardless of zoning, one cannot be sure in Draper City 
that property can be built on until you check with the City (Tr. 
83-84). 
10. Draper City will give one opinion one time and another 
opinion another time with respect to improvements on property (Tr. 
94) . 
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11. Mr. Whipple advertised the property for sale but never 
as a buildcible lot (Tr. 98) . 
12. Mr. Whipple was never made aware in his dealings with Mr. 
Hale that Plaintiffs intended to build on the lot, if in fact they 
did (Tr. 99). 
13. Although Sam Ovard knew a zoning variance would be 
required to build on the property (Tr. 214, 217, 220) he believed 
before and after the sale that a purchaser or Plaintiffs could 
obtain a variance or could get a building permit to build on the 
property (Tr. 71, 220) . He did not have any purpose in not 
disclosing such facts to Plaintiffs (Tr. 214). He was not aware 
that Plaintiffs, as they now claim, would not have purchased the 
property if they had known they could not build upon it without a 
variance (Tr. 215). 
14. Sam Ovard did not know the lane to the property did not 
meet access requirements for a variance (Tr. 217). 
15. A closing statement signed by Plaintiffs designated the 
lot as "undeveloped" (Tr. 197-198), and Plaintiffs made no inquiry 
as to whether the lot could be developed (Tr. 198-200). 
16. Plaintiffs do not know that they cannot get a building 
permit for the property and have never applied for one (Tr. 175). 
17. Under prior land use regulations, variances were granted 
by Draper City for building on three other lots on the lane leading 
to the lot in question, and under current regulations, such var-
iances have been granted on other lots in Draper City (Tr. 22-24) . 
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18. Plaintiffs1 purpose for purchasing the property was not 
to build on it themselves, but they were concerned someone else 
would purchase and build on it (Tr. 112-113, 119). 
19. Plaintiffs did not want anyone else to build on the 
property (Tr. 119, 155, 185). 
20. Plaintiffs did not purchase the property to build on it 
but purchased it in order to join it as a vacant lot with their 
adjacent house and to have more of an estate (Tr. 120), and horse 
property was of interest to Plaintiffs (Tr. 121). 
21. Plaintiffs were going to put a white picket fence around 
the property as a place for a horse and build a "lean to" on it 
(Tr. 121-122). 
22. Plaintiffs advised Mr. Hale they were going to use the 
property for horse pasture (Tr. 196). 
23. Plaintiffs never told Mr. Hale, before or after the sale, 
that they intended to build a home on the property (Tr. 122). 
24. Plaintiffs only expressed concern about being overpriced 
for the neighborhood by joining the vacant lot and their house 
together (Tr. 123-124). 
25. Mr. Hale assisted Plaintiffs in arriving at a value to 
be paid for the property (Tr. 115) , and they studied other proper-
ties to determine that joinder of the vacant lot and the house 
would not over price them for the neighborhood (Tr. 124-125, 186) . 
26. Neither Defendants nor Mr. Whipple had anything to do 
with Plaintiffs1 conclusion they could get their money out of the 
house and lot joined together (Tr. 186). 
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27. It was Mr. Halefs normal practice to explain the purpose 
that a buyer client has for purchasing property, but he does not 
recall disclosing to Defendants that Plaintiffs were concerned that 
someone else would build on the property. He only disclosed that 
Plaintiffs wanted to purchase the property for horse pasture (Tr. 
129-130). 
28. Plaintiffs relied on the fact that two other homes were 
being built to the right and left of their house for their con-
clusion that the property was a buildable lot. Such other houses 
were owned by persons other than Defendants. Defendants had 
nothing to do with the building of such other houses, and Plain-
tiffs did not rely on Defendants for Plaintiffs1 conclusion based 
on such other houses (Tr. 191-192). 
29. Plaintiffs did not recall even Mr. Hale telling them the 
property was a buildable lot (Tr. 195-196). 
30. In addition to Defendants Sam Ovard, Defendants Ben 
Ovard, Helen Ovard and Reva Ovard did not have conversations with 
Plaintiffs, they did not represent that the property could be built 
upon, they were not aware that Plaintiffs believed the property was 
a buildable lot or that Plaintiffs would not have purchased the 
property if they had known the property was not buildable (Tr. 229-
231, 237-238). 
b. Lack of reasonable investigation. 
Plaintiffs introduced no evidence that they performed any 
investigation to confirm their conclusion that the property was a 
buildable lot. Reasonable investigation on their part is required 
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under the circumstances in order to support reasonable reliance by 
Plaintiffs1. 
In Lewis v. White, 269 P.2d 865 (Utah 1954) , the Supreme Court 
considered the issue of fraud in the sale and purchase of a motel. 
The buyers contended that the sellers had made false representa-
tions as to insulation, sewage disposal, and income generated by 
the motel. The court said, "No matter how naive or inexperienced 
the [buyers] were, they could not close their eyes and accept 
unquestioningly any representations made to them. It was their 
duty to make such investigation and inquiry as reasonable care 
under the circumstances would dictate." Id. at 866. 
In Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952), plaintiffs 
brought an action for fraud in connection with sale of farm land 
to them. The basis for the claim was that part of the land was not 
of the same quality as the rest of the land, as had been repre-
sented. The defective land had not been cultivated or broken up 
and was obviously rocky. The Supreme Court held as a matter of 
law that the plaintiffs had not used reasonable care and diligence. 
The condition of the land had placed them on inquiry notice of its 
condition, and the most casual of inspections, stated the court, 
would have shown it was not good for cultivation. The court so 
ruled notwithstanding that when walking the property one of the 
plaintiffs had stated that he would break up the uncultivated land, 
and the defendant seller had thought "maybe you will and maybe you 
wonft," but said nothing. Id. at 275. 
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There was no fiduciary obligation in this case between the 
Defendants as sellers and the Plaintiffs as buyers. See Secor, 
supra at 795 (quoting Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 
1980)) . The trial court in this case found that, regardless of the 
relationship of the parties, Defendants did not make fraudulent or 
negligent misrepresentations and, even if they did, Plaintiffs 
could not reasonably rely on the misrepresentations because they 
had failed to exercise due diligence in determining the true status 
of the property (R. 205). Specifically, the trial court found that 
due to the location and appearance of the property and the road 
leading to and from the property, a reasonable person would have 
inquired as to access problems (R. 205-206). Because of these 
circumstances, and because the Plaintiffs have failed to marshal 
the evidence or show clear abuse by the lower court, its judgment 
should not be disturbed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S VIEWING OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS 
PROPER. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial judge erred in viewing the 
property in dispute because, in doing so, he relied on extrinsic 
evidence gathered at the viewing to find in favor of Defendants. 
Plaintiffs1 contention is based on conjecture and speculation and 
is without merit, as they have read misguided and unsupported 
interpretations into the trial judge's conclusions of law. 
A decision by the court to view the property in a dispute 
rests within the sound discretion of the court. O'Connor v. Dorv 
Corp., 381 A.2d 559 (Conn. 1977). The purpose of such a viewing 
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"is to assist in interpreting and resolving differences in evi-
dence," rather than to supply evidence totally lacking. Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy District v. Moore, 272 P.2d 176, 177 (Utah 
1954). At trial in this case conflicting evidence was presented 
as to whether a cul-de-sac existed at the time Plaintiffs purchased 
the property in dispute (Tr. 62, 172). Plaintiffs allege that 
there was no cul-de-sac at that time, and that the conditions of 
the property have changed dramatically since that time, thereby 
misleading the trial judge at his viewing. However, the Affidavits 
of neighboring residents submitted by Defendants state that the 
area is virtually identical now to what it was at the time Plain-
tiffs purchased the property (R. 238-39, 242-44). The only changes 
have been the installation of a cement gutter around the cul-de-
sac, not to define the cul-de-sac but to control water run-off; the 
planting of shrubs and plants on private property near the cul-de-
sac; and the installation of a cement wall on the front of private 
property which adjoins the cul-de-sac (R. 239, 243-44). None of 
these changes have caused the property to change dramatically in 
appearance. 
After viewing the property at the conclusion of the trial, the 
trial court stated in its Memorandum Opinion that: 
after having viewed the property, that due to the 
location of the property, the road leading from the main 
paved road ending in what appears to be somewhat of a 
cal-de-sac [sic], and under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, a reasonable person should have been alerted 
that there may be access problems associated with the 
back parcel that should be investigated. 
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(R. 142-43, 205-06). Plaintiffs have not shown that any of these 
factors considered by the trial judge did not exist at the time 
they purchased the property in question. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals has dealt with this issue in a 
similar case. In Thomas v. National State Bank, 628 P.2d 188 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1981), there was a dispute as to whether a house 
had been negligently constructed. Defendants contended that the 
trial court had erred in allegedly basing one of its findings in 
part on its viewing of the premises. The trial court had announced 
at the end of trial that it wished to view the property and 
received no objection from counsel. In finding for the plaintiff, 
the trial court stated, "This [the finding for the Plaintiff] is 
apparent both from the topographical map [introduced into evidence 
by defendants] and from a view of the premises which the court made 
...." Xd. at 190 (quoting trial court). The court of appeals 
stated that under these circumstances, defendants1 argument was 
without merit. Id. (citations omitted). 
Defendants are merely speculating when they allege that the 
trial court relied heavily on his viewing. The trial court in fact 
dispelled that notion in its Order Denying Motions for New Trial 
and to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence, when it 
stated that its viewing of the property in question was not of 
primary importance to its decision (R. 255-256). Even if it did 
put some reliance on the viewing, its reliance was proper, as it 
was only to assist in resolving differences in the evidence already 
presented. 
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Finally, the trial court's viewing of the property was agreed 
to by both Plaintiffs and Defendants (Tr. 264) . After such 
agreement and failure to object to the viewing prior to its 
occurrence and after being given the opportunity by the trial court 
to object, Plaintiffs1 later objection is precluded and without 
merit. 
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
The promissory note sued upon by Defendants provides for 
attorney's fees to Defendants upon default by Plaintiffs in payment 
of the same (Exh. 2-P) . Defendants should therefore be awarded 
attorney's fees and costs on this appeal, with the amount thereof 
to be determined by the trial court upon remand for that purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment should be affirmed for three 
reasons. First, the trial court's refusal to allow Plaintiffs to 
amend their pleadings to conform to the evidence was within the 
court's discretion, as Plaintiffs did not sufficiently try il-
legality or mistake. Second, the trial court's finding for 
Defendants on the question of fraud was within the court's discre-
tion and was not clearly erroneous, and Plaintiffs have failed to 
marshal the evidence to show otherwise and that they conducted 
reasonable investigation on their own. Finally, the trial court's 
viewing of the property in dispute was proper, and its subsequent 
decision was based on evidence in the record. Defendants should 
be awarded attorney's fees and costs on appeal and this matter 
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should be remanded to the trial court to determine the amount 
thereof. 
DATED May 15, 1989. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
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